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Abstract: In “Three Perspectives on Argument,” Wenzel argued that scholars should orient their research 
around the well-known triad of rhetorical, dialectical, and logical perspectives on argument. Despite the 
success of Wenzel’s triad in orienting pluralistic research, he nonetheless maintained that an “eventual 
synthesis” of the three perspectives was both possible and desirable. In this paper I reconsider Wenzel’s 
idea by asking what might be preventing such a synthesis today. I argue that one obstacle to this is a 
common philosophical assumption about rhetoric that opposes assertion to persuasion, truth to 
effectiveness. Following Barbara Cassin, I challenge this assumption and consider how rhetoric might be 
thought in terms of performance. In the first part of the paper I discuss Wenzel’s account of the triad and 
touch on a number of criticisms of the rhetorical approach that follow Wenzel’s characterization of it. 
Second, I turn to Cassin to help bring out the historical context of this characterization which I aim to 
challenge within argumentation theory. Finally, I argue for a way that we might reconcile epistemic- and 
audience-based concerns within the new rhetoric framework of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.   
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In his landmark essay “Three Perspectives on Argument,” Joseph W. Wenzel argued that scholars 
should orient their research around what is now the well-known triad of rhetorical, dialectical, and 
logical perspectives on argument. The lasting influence of this essay is apparent not only from the 
near universal adoption of this terminology among argumentation theorists, but also in the 
overwhelming attention that has since been given to the dialectical approach—which Wenzel had 
argued was the only perspective that could submit theses to “critical testing”. Despite the success 
of Wenzel’s triad in orienting pluralistic research, he nonetheless maintained that an “eventual 
synthesis” of the perspectives was both possible and desirable.  
In this paper I want to reconsider Wenzel’s idea by asking what might be preventing such 
a synthesis today. What I will argue is that one obstacle to this synthesis is a common philosophical 
assumption about rhetoric.1 This assumption is that rhetoric is concerned with adapting arguments 
to be “effective” rather than their inherent truth or validity. The problem with this assumption is 
that it creates un unbridgeable gap between epistemic and rhetorical concerns, which I argue need 
not be the case. As many of the points I develop in this paper require further elaboration, my aim 
is simply to raise enough doubt about the conventional framing of this opposition to encourage 
further reflection.  
 
1 As it is impossible to address the various ways of understanding rhetoric as a discipline in its own right and even as 
an approach with argumentation theory, here I will focus primarily on the “new rhetoric” of Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca.  
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In the first part of the paper I discuss Wenzel’s account of the distinction between logical 
dialectical, and rhetorical approaches to argument, and then touch on a number of criticisms of the 
rhetorical approach that follow Wenzel’s characterization of it. In the following section, I turn to 
the work of Barbara Cassin to help bring out the historical context of this characterization which 
long pre-dates Wenzel and which I aim to challenge within argumentation theory. Building on this 
discussion, I then return to argumentation where I argue for a way that we might reconcile 
epistemic- and audience-based concerns by following Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.   
 
 
2.  Wenzel’s Three Perspectives and the Reception of Rhetoric 
 
A good starting point for any discussion of rhetoric in argumentation theory is Wenzel’s 
“Perspectives on Argument”, the locus classicus—as Ralph Johnson has called it—for “the view 
that argumentation may be approached from different perspectives”.2 As is well known, Wenzel 
argues that the three perspectives on argumentation each focus on a different aspect of the overall 
phenomenon of “argumentation”: where the logical perspective approaches argument as a product, 
the dialectical approaches it as a procedure, and the rhetorical as a social process.3 While many 
today would contest the continued accuracy of Wenzel’s characterization of these three 
approaches, few would deny that this text has been a longstanding theoretical cornerstone of 
argumentation theory, and for this reason has had a considerable influence on the way that scholars 
understand the scope of their own research.   
 Let us briefly revisit Wenzel’s original motivation for his “system” and see how it stands 
up today. Wenzel gives four main reasons for the utility of his distinction.4 First, in view of the 
proliferation of studies on argumentation, Wenzel thought that the three perspectives could serve 
as a principle to organize scholarship.5 In this respect, his approach has proved to be tremendously 
helpful. Second, Wenzel thought that by opening up the perspectives from which argumentation 
could be analyzed, over time a more complete picture of argumentation would emerge.6 On this 
point as well, Wenzel seems to have been correct. Third, Wenzel hoped that the inclusion of the 
dialectical perspective would help to put it on equal footing among the then dominant rhetorical 
and logical perspectives.7 As the remarkable success of dialectical approaches will be of no 
surprise to anyone familiar with contemporary argumentation theory, here too Wenzel seems to 
have been right on the mark. 
For all this, it is on the fourth of Wenzel’s reasons that I want to focus. The fourth reason 
that Wenzel gives is that by carefully distinguishing the three perspectives on argument it is easier 
to prevent or eliminate “pseudo-problems” that arise in the literature.8 While the distinction may 
have performed this task for a time, I would submit that Wenzel’s version of the distinction on this 
point has run its course.  
 
 
2 Johnson (2009), “Revisiting the Logical/Dialectical/Rhetorical Triumvirate”, OSSA Conference Archive. 84. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/84 
3 Wenzel (1992), “Perspectives on Argument”, Readings in Argumentation, eds. Benoit & Hample, pp. 124. 
4 I do not here follow the order in which Wenzel gives these four reasons. 
5 Wenzel (1980), “Perspectives on Argument”, Readings in Argumentation, eds. Benoit & Hample, pp. 136. 
6 Ibid., pp. 139. 
7 Ibid., pp. 140. 
8 Ibid., pp. 136. 
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It seems to me that the biggest drawback of our continued use of the product, procedure, 
and process distinction to distinguish between competing approaches is that they often perpetuate 
a number of assumptions about argumentation. What I want to explore here is an assumption that 
can already be found in Wenzel but is in fact much older—and is in fact part of argumentation 
theory’s inheritance from the history of philosophy. This assumption is the idea that rhetoric is 
essentially concerned with “adapting discourse effectively to particular auditors”.9  
 To show that that this assumption did not stop with Wenzel, let us look at a few criticisms 
of rhetoric within argumentation theory that follow this general characterization. First, consider 
the epistemological theory of argument advocated by Christoph Lumer, who criticizes rhetoric for 
failing to establish any specific “truth conditions” other than convincing an audience.10 For Lumer, 
this failure is decisive precisely because his theory holds that “the standard function of argument” 
is “to lead the argument’s addressee to a (rationally) justified belief”.11 Thus, because rhetoric is 
concerned with communicating effectively to audiences, it must at some point neglect the 
“standard function”. In a similar way, John Biro and Harvey Siegel criticize rhetorical approaches 
for neglecting epistemic goodness altogether. For Biro and Siegel, as far as rhetoric is concerned  
a good argument can only be distinguished from a bad one on the basis of whether or not “it 
advances the arguer’s position”.12 Thus conceived, there are no external criteria by which rhetoric 
could coherently refuse to adopt certain strategies if it advanced the arguer’s position. What these 
critics share—other than that they advocate an ‘objective epistemic theory’ of argument—is that 
they view rhetorical concerns as having no bearing on the validity and truth of a particular 
argument. This is because they both understand rhetoric to be concerned with the efficaciousness 
of arguments, rather than their truth.  
Similar criticisms of rhetoric can also be found in approaches more sympathetic to 
rhetorical concerns. J. Anthony Blair, for example, concedes the importance of rhetorical analyses 
for understanding relevant contextual information that would not be immediately available from a 
spectator or analyst’s point of view.13 However, he continues, from the perspective of the real 
addressee of an argument, what must ultimately be assessed are “the logical and dialectical merits 
of the case made”.14 From another angle, in the pragma-dialectical approach—which purports to 
bridge the gap between the rhetorical and the dialectical—rhetoric is explicitly understood to be 
concerned with the “potential effectiveness” of arguments.15 Where for pragma-dialectics an 
argument’s reasonableness is decided by the satisfaction of dialectical criteria within a critical 
discussion, for Blair it is logic that always has the final say. 
 Despite the many differences among the authors mentioned above, a common view of what 
matters to rhetoric can be discerned. From the engaged participants point of view, rhetoric is 
concerned with understanding one’s audience for the purpose of arguing effectively to that 
audience. From the spectator’s point of view, rhetorical analysis is concerned with understanding 
all the complexities of real argumentative situations in order to understand why a particular 
argument was (or was not) effective in persuading an actual audience.   
 
9 Ibid., pp. 125, emphasis mine. 
10 Lumer (2005), “The Epistemological Theory of Argument—How and Why?”, Informal Logic, vol. 25(30), pp. 237. 
11 Ibid., pp. 213. 
12 Biro & Siegel (2006), “In Defense of the Objective Epistemic Approach to Argumentation”, Informal Logic, vol. 
26(1), pp. 91-101.  
13 Blair (2012), Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair, pp. 98.  
14 Ibid. 
15 van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2006), “Strategic Maneuvering: A Synthetic Recapitulation”, Argumentation, vol. 20, 
pp. 381-392.  
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 What clearly emerges from such an understanding is a tension between two major 
approaches. On the one hand, we have a strong philosophical approach that believes argumentation 
is about truth; and, on the other hand, we have approaches that seem more interested in adapting 
arguments in such a way that they will be effective in light of the social context in which they are 
used. What we have here is thus a deep disagreement about a number of complex and longstanding 
philosophical choices that probably will not, and likely should not, be solved within the field of 
argumentation studies alone. Instead of wading into these debates on their own terms, I want to 
come at this problem from a different angle. What I will argue is that this way of framing the 
problem assumes a philosophical orientation toward language that pigeonholes rhetoric into 
adopting an orientation toward language that is not its own.  In doing so this conventional way of 
understanding rhetoric as related to argument creates an unnecessary opposition between rhetorical 
and epistemic concerns. In what follows I turn to the work of Barbara Cassin, whose work can 
help argumentation theorists understand and overcome this deep-rooted dichotomy. 
 
 
3.  Epideixis, Apodeixis, and the Philosophical Eclipse of Rhetoric 
 
A good part of Barbara Cassin’s work consists of challenging the standard philosophical narrative 
about rhetoric that philosophy has inherited from Plato. As the Platonic story goes, rhetoric is a 
skill or technique applied to language that attempts to win the favour of audiences by speaking to 
them rather than about things as they really are. Philosophers, on the other hand, are less concerned 
with how a particular audience will receive arguments, as what really matters for the philosopher 
is the validity of arguments and the truth of their premises and conclusions. To the extent that 
argumentation theory inherits its conceptual resources from the history of philosophy, it should 
come as no surprise that the basic opposition at the heart of this philosophical origin story should 
find its way into argumentation theory. To see where this tension comes from and how it relates 
to argumentation theory, I will first provide a brief sketch of Cassin’s “sophistic” counter-history 
of philosophy.  
Cassin builds her case primarily on the work of Edward Schiappa, who argues that it was 
Plato himself who coined the term “rhetoric” [rhêtorikê], rather than the Sophists.16According to 
Schiappa, there is no known use of the term “rhetoric” before Plato’s Gorgias, which is believed 
to have been written around 385BC. While the term “rhetor” was widely used to refer to a person 
who gave public speeches, turning this practice into “rhetoric”, a craft or technique of speaking, 
by all accounts appears to be an invention of Plato. Instead, Cassin points out, the sophists 
themselves refer only to their use of logos and not a specific technique called “rhetoric”. What has 
happened then, Cassin continues, is that a particular philosophical way of understanding logos, of 
understanding language, reason, and argument, has come to conceal all others. As Cassin explains: 
  
My claim is that rhetoric is a philosophical invention, an attempt to tame logos, in particular, 
the Sophist’s logos and its effects. The creation of rhetoric by philosophy is itself the very first 
“rhetorical turn”… [This] matters because the strength of logos has been made to vanish, 
caught and subsumed under rhetoric. And rhetoric itself has been made to vanish as soon as it 
is born.17 
 
 
16 Schiappa (1990), “Did Plato Coin Rhētorikē?”, American Journal of Philology, vol. 111(4), pp. 457-470. 
17 Cassin (2014), Sophistical Practice, pp. 76. 
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What Cassin is getting at here is that our understanding of rhetoric as a particular technique is born 
out of a philosophical maneuver that circumscribes the legitimate use of logos. In doing so, Plato 
establishes the familiar opposition between philosophical speech, or speech that asserts what is 
(i.e. ontology), and rhetorical speech, which is concerned less with the way things are than it is 
with speaking to please others or win their favour.  
 What Cassin ultimately wants to do is to step outside of the false opposition created by 
Plato and rehabilitate what she calls “sophistics” [la sophistique], a countermodel to the standard 
philosophical narrative about logos. According to Cassin, what is lost in this narrative is an 
understanding of logos as being first and foremost performative (logos epideiktikos), rather than 
assertive (logos apophantikos).18  
For Cassin, what is important about this notion of performance (epideixis), is that it 
confronts philosophy with the hidden “third dimension” of language:  
 
Counting two is what philosophy has habituated us to. When one speaks, one can either “speak 
of” or “speak to”… “To speak of,” to unveil, to describe, to demonstrate, is of the major 
register of philosophy… “To speak to,” to persuade, to have an effect on the other, is of the 
register of rhetoric. From the point of view of philosophia perennis, there is no third dimension 
of language.19 
 
According to Cassin, the standard philosophical narrative about rhetoric involves an understanding 
of language in terms of two axes. Where the first axis is concerned with the relation between what 
a speaker says and the world (philosophy), the second axis is concerned with the relation between 
a speaker and his or her audience (rhetoric). The first axis concerns the “speaking of” relation and 
the second concerns the “speaking to” relation. Against the perennial opposition of these two axes, 
Cassin is trying to develop a notion of epideixis prior to the way that it has been interpreted 
philosophically. For Cassin, unlike Aristotle and Perelman,20 epideixis or performance is 
 
the rhetorical genre par excellence, but in excess of rhetoric philosophically assigned to its 
place: epideixis does not describe in terms of truth nor simply produces an effect of persuasion, 
but it carries out [effectue] with felicity what I call a world effect [effet-monde].21  
 
This “world effect”, for Cassin, thus neither purports to propositionally describe the world as it 
“really is”, nor effect any kind of persuasion in an audience. Instead, what Cassin means by 
epideixis is rather something like a showing of something, and of oneself, before others in public. 
What Cassin wants to remind us of with this notion is the performative level of speech prior to the 
analytic seperation of assertions from the speakers, audiences, and situations in which they emerge.  
To bring this discussion of Cassin’s analyis back to argumentation, what she shows is why 
the predominant philosophical orientation toward language in argumentation theory is so hostile 
to rhetoric. What I want to show here is that this does not have to be the case if we look at the 
problem from a different angle. By taking this into account, we can avoid conflating two senses of 
the term “effective”. In the first sense, at the level of what Cassin calls “speaking to”, “effective” 
refers to the real outcome of speech on an actual audience, i.e. whether or not the speech succeeds 
 
18 Cassin (2014), Sophistical Practice, pp. 195. 
19 Cassin (2014), Sophistical Practice, pp. 194. 
20 I challenge this reading of Perelman (and Olbrechts-Tyteca) below. 
21 Cassin, (2018), Quand dire, c’est vraiment faire : Homère, Gorgias et le peuple arc-en-ciel, pp. 96, translation 
mine. 
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in acheiving its intended outcome. This sense of the term is the one used by Wenzel and others to 
characterize rhetorical approaches to argument. In the second sense of what Cassin calls a “world 
effect”, there is a more basic meaning of term “effective”. In this second sense, the performance 
of speech is effective to the extent that it is a form of social action that modifies, to some degree, 
the situation from which it emerges. 
In the final section, I will explore some of the consequences of Cassin’s account in light of 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetorical approach to argumentation. 
 
 
4.  Assertion, Persuasion, Performance 
 
As we saw above, Cassin argues that philosophers typically understand the incompatibility of the 
philosophical and the rhetorical in terms of two axes of language, what she called the axes of 
“speaking of” and “speaking to”. Since it is only the first axis—the traditional axis of philosophy—
that admits of being true or false, rhetoric is relegated to a place detached from the world, and from 
truth. By stepping outside of this opposition, however, Cassin wants to draw our attention to a 
“third dimension” of logos. As we saw, this epideictic dimension of language was not that of 
assertion or persuasion, but that of performance, and the production of a “world effect”.22 How are 
we to understand this in light of the particular concerns of argumentation theory? 
Although Cassin identifies Perelman as one of the “contemporary theoreticians of rhetoric” 
who remain implicated in the “philosophical” way of thinking about rhetoric, to a certain extent I 
think that both Cassin and Perelman are pushing in the same direction. As I have argued elsewhere, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s project involves a radical rethinking of the epideictic genre of 
rhetoric as it is found in Aristotle.23 In The Realm of Rhetoric, Perelman explains that instead of 
thinking about epideixis as but one of three rhetorical genres it should be understood as part and 
parcel of the act of arguing itself.24 Recalling that the epideictic genre was traditionally understood 
to be concerned with praise or blame, Perelman sees that at a certain level all arguments function 
in this way below the surface. Beneath the content of a particular argument, at the level of form all 
argumentation aims to “praise or blame” in a certain sense: through the act of arguing particular 
values are either selected and emphasized, or ignored and downplayed, within the broader horizon 
of values. By shifting attention toward this structural feature of argumentation, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca seem to gesture toward an understanding of argumentation as a form of social 
action, rather than solely as an object of judgment, as something that can be true or false.  
Although not always consistent in doing so, it seems to me that this perspectival shift is 
why Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca need to introduce new concepts and categories when it might 
not otherwise be clear why they are needed. As they explain in the introduction to The New 
Rhetoric, what they claim to be interested in are “argumentative structures, the analysis of which 
must precede all experimental tests of…effectiveness”.25 Here, we find clear evidence that what 
 
22 Cassin’s development of this develops through a reading of J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1975). 
While I have not explained her departure from Austin here, it may be helpful to note that Cassin’s understanding of 
epideixis is closest to what Austin calls “illocution”. The major difference is that Cassin’s broader project is to think 
linguistic performance (illocutionary) outside the “regime” of apophansis (locutionary).  
23 Scott, “Argumentation and the Challenge of Time: Perelman, Temporality, and the Future of Argument”, 
Argumentation 34 (2020), pp. 30-31. 
24 Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, pp. 20.  
25 Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, pp. 9, emphasis mine.  
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interests Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is not a set of techniques that enable effective persuasion, 
but rather the basic structures of argumentation itself.  
To see an example of this, let us consider the difference between “persuasion” and 
“adherence”. Where “persuasion” refers to the way in which an argument does or does not achieve 
“validity for a particular audience”, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the term 
“adherence” to describe an essential structure of argumentation.26 While adherence may appear at 
first glance to be a synonym for persuasion, adherence is in fact something constitutive of 
argumentation. Unlike persuasion, adherence is not something won through effective discourse; 
rather, adherence is something always already present in an argumentative situation. To put this 
another way: if argumentation is fundamentally a kind of social action, the goal or aim of that 
action, irrespective of any arguer’s particular motives, is to intensify, diminish, or modify 
adherence. Notice the difference here: persuasion is but one possible goal of argumentation. 
Sometimes we argue to persuade our interlocutor, sometimes we argue to develop our own position 
further, and so on. Irrespective of any of these explicit goals, all arguers and audiences adhere to 
a particular set values, intellectual beliefs, and affective attachments to some degree of intensity at 
any given time; and it is this set of variables that Perelman calls “adherence”. Furthermore, this is 
why argumentation for Perelman is not so much about installing our own beliefs into the audience 
as it is about a “transfer of adherence” within the audience that pre-exists the argumentative 
situation entirely.27 
At this level of analysis, what we are interested in then is the effectiveness of argument at 
the epideictic level, i.e. at the level of an argument understood as a practice, as a form of social 
action. And it is in this sense and to this extent, I would argue that rhetorical approaches are 
primarily concerned with audiences.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have tried to show that a common philosophical assumption about the meaning of 
rhetoric in argumentation theory leads to an unsurpassable divide between epistemic- and 
audience-based concerns. By shifting the terms of this conflict from apodeixis to epideixis through 
my reading of Cassin, I argued that rhetoric can and should be understood beyond the opposition 
of “speaking of” and “speaking to”. When it is conceived only in terms of the latter, rhetoric cannot 
but appear as suspicious to philosophy for neglecting the assertive axis of language, the traditional 
locus of truth. Although rhetoric may also have something to say about arguing effectively, I have 
tried to show that this is not the only sense of the term “effective” that is of interest to rhetoric. 
When analyzed as a form of action, or as performance (epideixis) as is the case in Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, rhetoric can also investigate the ways that argumentation acts upon the persons, 
places, objects, and values that populate any argumentative situation. Unlike persuasive effects, 
these “world effects”, as Cassin calls them, cannot simply be contrasted with assertion and taken 
to neglect the world; for in a very real sense it is through the performance of argument that the 
world we inhabit is created, sustained, and modified by these very effects. Understood rhetorically, 
argument is thus one of the ways in which we do things with words.  
 
26 It is worth recalling that the term “persuasion” (or “conviction”, which is contrasted with persuasion) appears 
nowhere in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definition of argumentation. In every instance that they define the object 
of their theory of argumentation the term “adherence” is used.  
27 Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric, pp. 21. 
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